Downing literal infringement of independent claim 1, CAFC agreed with the district court that “telephone terminal” and “customer terminal means” limitations required technological vestiges, namely, dialing the phone, that the accused cell phone and computer products lacked. Also stillborn -

The question of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents is a factual question, and Furnace Brook has not introduced evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to that question.

'832 claim 5 was a a means-plus-function claim.

The district court... stated in its claim construction order that the scope of a means-plus-function limitation “is . . . limited to the structures disclosed in the specification, and their equivalents,” which indicates that the court understood the requirements of section 112, paragraph 6. The district court then addressed the issue of equivalent means at the summary judgment stage, holding that “no reasonable juror could find an insubstantial difference between the ‘[c]ustomer [t]erminal [m]eans’ disclosed in the ’832 patent” and an Internet-enabled cellular telephone or personal computer.