Choate looked at seven corporations backing CPF: Intel, Dell, HP, Cisco, Oracle, Micron, and Apple.

The primary advocates of this historic alteration of U.S. patent law are a group of Big Tech corporations operating together as the Coalition for Patent Fairness (CPF). In this paper, I analyze the finances and actions of the seven founding corporations of that coalition. If patent laws truly require the drastic changes that would be mandated by The Patent Reform Act of 2007, the justification would be obvious in those corporations’ experiences. But in fact, they are not. My conclusion is that rather than trying to alter their business practices to conform to existing U.S. patent laws, these corporations are trying to alter those laws to fit their business model.

Choate examined the CPF arguments for statutory patent change.

On the U.S. economy increasingly bogged down in patent disputes:

Patent lawsuits as a percentage of patents granted have remained constant at 1.5 percent over the last 15 years (i.e., 1.57 percent in 1996 versus 1.55 percent in 2006). With an expanding economy and more innovation, the absolute number of patent applications filed and patents issued has increased, but there has been no abnormal surge of patent litigation.

On venue choice (the CPF wants to gimp patent suits to districts ill-equipped to deal with them, as contrasted to those districts well-versed in patents and able to handle this complex area of law):

In the period 1996-2006, the seven CPF founders were defendants in 285 lawsuits, of which 98 were in a rocket docket (34 percent). During that same period, they were plaintiffs in 116 cases, of which 43 were in a rocket docket (37 percent). When suing, in other words, they behaved just the same as those who sued them.

More telling is the litigation data of recent years. In the five-year period 2002-2006, the CPF founders were defendants in 192 lawsuits, of which 78 were in rocket dockets (40 percent). In the same period, they were plaintiffs in 71 cases, of which 34 were in rocket dockets (48 percent).

[R]ocket dockets are not a problem for the CPF founders when they are suing others. On a proportionate basis, these seven companies use the rocket dockets more than those suing them. As these statistics suggest, when a corporation believes its patents are being violated and cannot secure a settlement, it seeks a fast resolution in a docket skilled in patent law.

That patents represent a drain on innovation, or even a drain on CPF big guns, which have been more saddled with antitrust suits than patents:

In the 11-year period 1996-2006, the seven CPF founding corporations disclosed $1.9 billion in patent settlement payments, an average of $173 million per year. During that same time, these seven corporations had collective revenues of more than $1.7 trillion.

As a percent of their revenues for those 11 years, disclosed patent settlements were one-ninth of one percent (0.11 percent). In the entire 11-year period, the highest portion of total revenues devoted to patent settlement was in 2002, when it was 3/10th of one percent (0.3 percent). In 2006, the ratio of patent settlements to revenues was 1/25th of one percent (0.04 percent). This hardly seems a great burden on these seven companies.

If these seven companies face a litigation crisis, it is found in antitrust suits in which they have been involved. Between 1996 and 2006, these seven companies have been involved in 247 antitrust cases, of which 229 were in the period 2002-2006.

In 1996, the seven founders of the CPF invested $6.2 billion in R&D. In 2006, they invested $17.2 billion in R&D – an increase of 277 percent. Collectively, the CPF founders invested more than $131 billion on R&D for the period 1996 to 2006. Disclosed patent settlements equaled 1.5 percent of the total R&D investment, which suggests that patent litigation has had no significant impact on their research and development activities.

That patents divert resources that could have been invested in creating jobs:

The implied argument is that a change of U.S. patent law would free up monies to create more and better jobs for American workers. Yet, these seven companies have been at the forefront of the off shoring of U.S.-based R&D and jobs.

Some CPF corporations have even more of their jobs overseas. Hewlett Packard, at the end of 2006, had 54,000 employees based in the United States, but more than 101,000 in overseas facilities. Oracle had 26,000 U.S.-based employees and more than 48,000 located in other nations. So too, Dell had almost 40,000 foreign-based workers, but barely 26,000 in the U.S. Intel’s work force is split – half in the United States and half abroad. Micron Technology, which is the largest employer in Idaho with 9,000 jobs, recently announced that it is shifting a major portion of its manufacturing jobs to China. Because Apple relies on foreign contract manufacturers, it is impossible to determine how many workers are involved in the making of its products.

The patent license fees these big companies pay typically go to support U.S. inventors, who are presumably just the sort of smart and creative people policymakers want to encourage. Denying them a decent income so that large transnational companies, which these are, can spend more on cheaper foreign factories and workers makes little economic sense.

The point is these seven companies have extensive employment overseas and no change in current U.S. patent law is likely to change that economic dynamic.

The paper lists in the appendix: Amendments to the Patent Act (35 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.) since 1952; Significant International Patent Related Agreements since 1952; Significant Supreme Court Cases since 1952; Significant Amendments to Patent Regulations; Patents Granted and Lawsuits Commenced, showing the 1.5% asserted as remarkable steady 1993-2006; and other statistics regarding the "sister seven" of CPF.