Mangosoft v. Oracle (CAFC 2007-1250)

In 2002, Mangosoft filed suit against Oracle and accused Oracle's Real Applications Clusters ("RAC") software, sold in conjunction with its 9i and 10g database software, of infringing a total of 38 claims of both the '377 patent and a related patent. Oracle counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment of invalidity, unenforceability, and non-infringement. In 2004, the district court construed several disputed claim terms after holding a Markman hearing. With respect to the term "local," it held that

the word "local" when used to modify a computer device means a computer device (e.g., a hard drive) that is directly attached to a single computer's processor by, for example, the computer's bus.

Mangosoft, Inc. v. Oracle Corp., No. 02-CV-545, slip op. at 20 (D.N.H. Sept. 21, 2004) ("Claim Construction Opinion") (noting additionally that a hard disk "that is 'local' to one computer may also be shared with, or accessed by, other computers on the network"). The district court distinguished "local" memory devices from "shared," "networked," or "remote" memory devices, and rejected Mangosoft's request to construe "local" to "simply requir[e] a computer memory device that is somehow 'linked' to a computer (whether directly or indirectly)." Id. at 18-20 (noting that such a construction would render the term "local" superfluous or redundant in light of claim 1's requirement that local memory devices be "coupled" to a computer).

Mangosoft pruned its claim assertion. The district court, in summary judgment, pruned it further: to zero, on non-infringement. Mangosoft appealed.

Mangosoft took exception to dictionary definition. The CAFC gave that no exception.

Mangosoft relies heavily on the fact that the district court's opinion preceded Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc), and principally argues that the result was improperly influenced by references made by the parties to a technical dictionary. Mangosoft's position is misplaced for several reasons and places undue weight on what it contends was the district court's reliance on the Texas Digital methodology. See generally Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1319-22 (discussing Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). First, while there is no question that dictionaries were considered, even Phillips recognized that reference to such sources is not prohibited so long as the ultimate construction given to the claims in question is grounded in the intrinsic evidence and not based upon definitions considered in the abstract. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318 (noting that "dictionaries, and especially technical dictionaries, endeavor to collect the accepted meanings of terms used in various fields of science and technology" and thus "have been properly recognized as among the many tools that can assist the court in determining the meaning of particular terminology to those of skill in the art of the invention"); see also Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp., 483 F.3d 800, 809 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ("Although in Phillips we rejected an approach in which a broad dictionary definition is adopted and then whittled down only if contradicted by the specification, we did not prohibit the use of dictionaries in claim construction, nor did we define at what point in the claim construction analysis they may be consulted." (internal citation omitted)); Old Town Canoe Co. v. Confluence Holdings Corp., 448 F.3d 1309, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ("The district court's reference to the dictionary was not an improper attempt to find meaning in the abstract divorced from the context of the intrinsic record but properly was a starting point in its analysis, which was centered around the intrinsic record consistent with Phillips.").

The appeals court thumbed its nose at Mangosoft's approach.

Second, we review judgments, not opinions, and need not focus on the methodology used by the district court. Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (noting "the familiar principle that this court does not review supporting arguments, but only the decisions reached by the trial court" (citing Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1983))); see also Acumed, 483 F.3d at 809 n.2 ("Our de novo review means that we need not decide whether the logic or subsidiary definitions used by the district court to reach the correct construction were sound. . . . We review only the district court's finished product, not its process."). Finally, even though the district court did not have the benefit of Phillips at the time of its decision, the court's claim construction is fully consistent with and supported by the intrinsic record--as well as the dictionary--and thus fully comports with our precedent.

Having found support for the district court's claim construction in the claim language, the specification, and the prosecution history of the '377 patent, we note that this construction is also consistent with the technical dictionary definition proffered by Oracle.

Affirmed.