Duratech Industries v. Bridgeview Manufacturing (CAFC 2008-1157) non-precedential

Before the district court, the "manipulator" claim element was the only disputed claim limitation. Duratech argued that the term should be construed as a means-plus-function limitation under 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 6, whereas Bridgeview argued that the term is better understood as connoting structure, and not subject to means-plus-function treatment.

A limitation of means is what it seems. Lacking evidence to the contrary, presumption of plain meaning in construction is "a strong one."

This court determines the ordinary and customary meaning of claim terms as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, using the methodology expounded in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312-19 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).

A patentee's use of the word "means" in a claim limitation creates a presumption that 35 U.S.C. § 112 paragraph 6 applies. TriMed, Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 514 F.3d 1256, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Conversely, a claim term without the word "means" suggests that § 112, paragraph 6 does not apply. See Personalized Media Communs., L.L.C. v. ITC, 161 F.3d 696, 703-04 (Fed. Cir. 1998). This court has consistently held that "[m]eans-plus-function claiming applies only to purely functional limitations that do not provide the structure that performs the recited function." Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1311. Further, "[i]n considering whether a claim term recites sufficient structure to avoid application of section 112 P 6, we have not required the claim term to denote a specific structure. Instead, we have held that it is sufficient if the claim term is used in common parlance or by persons of skill in the pertinent art to designate structure, even if the term covers a broad class of structures and even if the term identifies the structures by their function." Lighting World, Inc. v. Birchwood Lighting, Inc., 382 F.3d 1354, 1359-60 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

The absence of "means" language in the disputed claim term "manipulator" entitles Bridgeview to a presumption that means-plus-function treatment does not apply. This presumption "is a strong one that is not readily overcome." Id. at 1358. Thus, this court looks to whether the term "manipulator" is one which does not recite "sufficiently definite structure." Id.

The claimed "manipulator" was a structural element.

The ordinary meaning of the term suggests that "manipulator" is a noun whose meaning connotes sufficient structure. "Manipulator" is not a generic structural term of the ilk of such placeholder terms as "mechanism," "device," or "element," whose meaning requires illumination from the specification. No doubt, the term "manipulator" does not conjure up any one specific structure. However, it does convey to one of skill in the art a certain genus of structures known as "manipulators." Bridgeview presented evidence that practitioners within the mechanical arts field frequently use the term "manipulator" to define structure coupled with functions, pointing out several prior art device patents in which the term is used in claims without being coupled to the word "means." Tellingly, Duratech's own expert opined that "a manipulator performing nearly identical functions is shown in the prior art," implicitly evidencing his understanding of "manipulator" as a word whose meaning is not purely functional.

This court's precedent is clear that "the fact that a particular mechanism . . . is defined in functional terms is not sufficient to convert a claim element containing that term into a 'means for performing a specified function.'" Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, 91 F.3d 1580, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). As this court noted in Greenberg, many devices take their names from the functions they perform, such as filters, brakes, locks, and clamps. Id. Similarly, simply because claim 1's "manipulator" takes its name from the verb "manipulate," this does not compel the application of § 112, paragraph 6.

In this case, the dictionary trumped ersatz reading of the spec. The court made a small error in referring to a current dictionary (Oxford 2008), rather than one dated to the time of the invention.

This court has also looked to dictionary definitions to discern whether a disputed term is recognized as a noun denoting structure. See Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 91 F.3d 1580, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("Dictionary definitions make clear that the noun 'detent' denotes a type of device with a generally understood meaning in the mechanical arts, even though the definitions are expressed in functional terms."); Lighting World, 382 F.3d at 1361 ("Dictionary definitions in this case disclose that the term 'connector' has a reasonably well-understood meaning as a name for structure."). In the instant case, dictionaries readily identify that a "manipulator" falls into a specific category of structural devices. For example, Random House Unabridged Dictionary (1997) defines "manipulator" as a "mechanical device for the remote handling of objects or materials in conditions not permitting the immediate presence of workers." Further, Oxford English Dictionary (2008) defines the term generally as "a device used for or in the manipulation of something" and then provides auxiliary definitions for specific types of manipulators, including: "the transmitter of a dial telegraph," "device for massaging or pummelling the body of a bedridden person, as a substitute for exercise," "an instrument used to teach deaf people how to articulate sounds," and "a mechanical device for handling radioactive or hazardous material, operated by remote control from behind a protective shield." This court has clarified in Phillips that dictionaries often lack the specific context relevant to the legal and technical art of claim drafting and interpretation. See Philips, 415 F.3d at 1321. With that limitation on dictionary usages in mind, this court notes that these particular definitions bolster the conclusion that "manipulator" is not a mere "nonce word or a verbal construct," Lighting World, 382 F.3d at 1360, but instead a noun connoting sufficient structure.

Duratech assigns great weight to many references in the specification in which the inventor describes "manipulation means," "means for manipulating," or a "support and manipulation mechanism." This, however, ignores the fact that the '104 patent uses the word "manipulator" numerous times in a manner that connotes structure. For example, "[a]ny number of manipulator rollers are possible, however, the disintegrator is located between and below two of the manipulator rollers," '104 patent, Col. 1, ll. 31-34; "Often, the result of this impeded rotation is that the teeth of the manipulator rollers tend to break the crop material bale apart . . ." Id., Col. 2, ll. 23-25; "the manipulator rollers 26 would continue to be rotatable in either direction, though clockwise would be their preferred direction of rotation," Id., Col. 6, ll. 22-24. These references in the specification further support a conclusion that this record does not contain enough evidence to rebut the strong presumption against means-plus-function treatment.

Manipulator, as used in the '104 patent, is not a purely functional placeholder whose structure is filled in by the specification.

Vacated and remanded.

Another simple claim construction misconstrued a the district level. Another chip on the pile for a dedicated patent circuit court.