Lexion Medical v. Northgate Technologies (CAFC 2009-1494) precedential; Rader (author), Dyk, Prost

Claim Construction

11. A method of providing heated, humidified gas into a patient for an endoscopic procedure comprising the steps of:

a) directing pressure- and volumetric flow rate-controlled gas, received from an insufflator into a chamber having a means for heating the gas to a temperature within a predetermined range and a means for humidifying the gas and being disposed immediately adjacent to the patient, wherein the chamber is in flow communication with and immediately adjacent to a means for delivering the gas to the interior of the patient;

b) sensing the temperature of the gas as it exits the chamber to determine if it is within the predetermined range; and

c) actuating the heating means if the temperature of the gas is without the predetermined range;

d) humidifying the gas within the chamber; and

e) flowing the gas into the delivery means such that the gas enters the patient humidified and having a temperature within 2°C of the predetermined temperature and thus providing the gas.

Gas delivery "within 2°C" was the disputed limitation.

This court gives words of a claim their ordinary and customary meaning. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). The customary meaning of a claim term is not determined in a vacuum and should be harmonized, to the extent possible, with the intrinsic record, as understood within the technological field of the invention. Id. at 1314 (citing Medrad, Inc. v. MRI Devices Corp., 401 F.3d 1313, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); see also ACTV, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 346 F.3d 1082, 1088 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("[T]he context of the surrounding words of the claim also must be considered in determining the ordinary and customary meaning of those terms").

Context in claim construction is the significant theme of this precedential ruling.

Limitations (b) and (c) of claim 11 inform the meaning of limitation (e) of the claim. This court prefers a claim interpretation that harmonizes the various elements of the claim to define a workable invention. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315-16 (the construction that "most naturally aligns with the patent's description of the invention will be, in the end, the correct construction").

Reading limitations (b), (c), and (e) together shows, as the trial court correctly concluded, that the claimed invention will tolerate and correct minor fluctuations outside of the 4°C range of limitation (e). Limitation (b) requires the claimed method to "sens[e] the temperature of the gas as it exits the chamber to determine if it is within the predetermined range," and limitation (c) adds that, in response to limitation (b), the device can "actuat[e] the heating means if the temperature of the gas is without the predetermined range[.]" '474 patent col.12 ll.55-60. Because limitations (b) and (c) imply that gas leaving the chamber will fluctuate briefly outside of the predetermined range, the range of the gas entering the patient through a tube leading from the chamber, as described by limitation (e), must have the same fluctuations.

The district court thus also gives a correct meaning to the term "within" in the contested limitation. In the context of this particular invention, "within" does not mean "always within." Indeed, as noted above, both the claim context which includes limitations (b) and (c) and the specification inform one of ordinary skill in this art that "within" carries a reasonable meaning that tolerates temperature fluctuations in the normal start-up and usage of the invention. This court also observes that alternative wordings of this limitation, such as the alternatives "sometimes within" or "occasionally within" proposed by Northgate, would disrupt more than promote the definitional precision of the "within 2°C" limitation as limited to minor variations.

Beyond the claim context and language, the specification also permits minor fluctuations outside of the 2°C range in limitation (e).

The district court correctly interpreted "having a temperature within 2°C of the predetermined temperature" not to require the claimed device to always be with 2°C of the predetermined temperature. Thus, the trial court's interpretation of this phrase reflects accurately both the claim language and the specification's support for that claim language.

Infringement

At the trial preceding Lexion I, Dr. John Burban ("Burban") provided expert testimony that the Humi-Flow released gas "having a temperature within 2°C of the predetermined temperature."

The district court permitted Lexion to rely on Burban's second declaration to show that the accused device delivered gas within 2°C of the predetermined temperature. Burban's second declaration followed the remand wherein this court provided a new claim construction to the district court. Lexion I, 292 Fed. Appx. at 51-52. This court remanded to permit the trial court to reassess the case in the context of the new claim construction. Id. In that context, the district court had wide discretion to permit the parties to supplement the record with new factual declarations consistent with the new understanding of the claim. Bowers v. BayState Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (a change in claim construction at the appellate level "generally necessitates a remand to the district court to consider new factual issues"). In the context of a new claim construction, the district court did not abuse its discretion by permitting Lexion to submit Burban's second declaration.

The record also shows that the trial court properly concluded that, drawing all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, Lexion was entitled to summary judgment of infringement. The record shows no material disputes of fact that the accused Humi-Flow device heats and maintains gas as a "predetermined temperature" within the claimed range, allowing for minor fluctuations. Moreover, where the record adequately supports the judgment, the district court does not have an obligation to recite every detail of its reasoning. See, e.g., Univ. of Pittsburgh v. Varian Med. Sys. Inc., 569 F.3d 1328, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (vacating and remanding judgment not supported by the record). In this case, the record sufficiently supports the trial court's judgment.

Affirmed.