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August 5, 2011

Rear Wheels

Albert Fairclough got 5,622,375 for a two-child push-chair. During earlier prosecution of the family, Fairclough found out about a couple of highly material prior art references, which he duly neglected to inform the USPTO of. Joovy, '375 owner, sued Target, which admitted infringement, but asserted prior art invalidity and unenforceability by inequitable conduct. The North Texas district court granted summary judgment of inequitable conduct, but denied invalidity. The CAFC flipped that sunny-side up: broadening claim construction on "rear wheels," thus paving the path to anticipation, while not bothering with unenforceability.

Joovy v. Target (CAFC 2010-1323) non-precedential; Judges Rader, Linn (author), Prost

Case law setup -

This court reviews the denial of a motion for JMOL under the law of the regional circuit. Orion IP, LLC v. Hyundai Motor Am., 605 F.3d 967, 973 (Fed. Cir. 2010). "The Fifth Circuit reviews a denial of JMOL de novo" and determines "whether the facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of one party that . . . reasonable jurors could not arrive at a contrary verdict." Id. (internal citation omitted). "In our review of the denial of JMOL, we are mindful of the fact that anticipation is a question of fact that we review for substantial evidence." Id. at 974. Claim construction is a question of law that this court reviews de novo. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed.Cir.1998) (en banc).

Target wanted the trainers off the rear wheels.

Target contends that the district court erred in construing "rear wheels" in claim 1 to mean "rear wheels of the push-chair." Target argues that the context of the other limitations in claim 1 imposes two criteria on "rear wheels": they must be "(1) 'attached' to the 'frame' of the stroller and (2) 'mounted adjacent the trailing edge of the platform.'" Cross-Appellant Br. 50. According to Target, "just as in [Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)], the intrinsic evidence does not support a 'restrictive definition' of 'rear wheels' that includes the modifier 'of the push-chair,' and the ordinary meaning of the term--'rear wheels' means 'rear wheels'--must govern here, limited only by the [] criteria imposed by Claim 1." Id. at 53.

So it was on appeal.

Accordingly, this court holds that the district court erred in importing the modifier "of the push-chair" into the definition of the term "rear wheels" in claim 1.

With the rear wheels unconstrained, Target targeted '375 with one of the references (Dronyk) that Fairclough should have disclosed to the PTO but didn't. The wheels flew off the assertion.

This court holds that under the proper claim construction of "rear wheels," Dronyk unquestionably discloses each and every element of claim 1 and, thus, anticipates the claims under 35 U.S.C. ยง 102(b) as a matter of law.

Rolling no more mooted the weasel behind the stroller.

Because the district court held that the '375 Patent was unenforceable due to inequitable conduct prior to this court's decision in Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson, & Co., ___ F.3d ___, 2011 WL 2028255 (Fed. Cir. May 25, 2011) (en banc), and because Target explicitly waived remand to the district court to decide the issue of inequitable conduct in the event that this court holds, as we now have, that claim 1 of the '375 Patent is invalid, this court vacates the district court's JMOL of unenforceability.

Posted by Patent Hawk at August 5, 2011 12:33 PM | Prior Art